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ABSTRACT 
In the frame of the proliferation treaty, the problem was poned to lspra 
for giving a unique and tamperproof identity to MTR fuel elements. 
This report describes the chosen solution and put some emphasis on the 
devices and fuel element preparation necessary for the application of seals. 
In addition at the conclusions, the minutes of the meeting held at lspra on 
this specific subject are entirely reported. 
This method was declared ready for practical application by the Safeguards 
Directorate. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose 
In the frame of the non profile ration treaty, Ispra was given the problem 
of giving a unique and tamperproof identity to nuclear fuel ele~ nts. 
The first practical case to solve was that of the MTR fuel element plate. 
A solution was patented in 1969 both for MTR plates and for other types of 
fuel elements (rods, assemblies). The development work began, however, 
with the MTR fuel element ( 1) (2). 
A collection of advice and criticisms was received during a meeting of 
MTR fuel element manufacturers at Ispra in 1969 at which the firms 
NUKEM, Hanau, Germany; CERCA, Romans, France; and MMN, Mol, 
Belgium were represented. 
l. 2. MTR fuel element 
The fuel bundle is composed of plates held between two edge plates (Fig. 1). 
Fig. 1 
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Two nozzles are welded or screwed to the ends of the fuel element. The 
plates are fabricated using the picture frame technique: rolling of three 
superimposed plates, the central one being a frame within which the fuel 
alloy is placed (Fig. 2) 
Fig. 2: Initial sandwich for the fabrication of MTR plates 
1 and 3: External plates in Al. 
2 Al central frame. 
A Central window in which the enriched fuel core is placed. 
B Place selected for the introduction of the inclusions used for 
the identification. 
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2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MTR FUEL ELEMENT 
Applying the general principle of ultrasonic detection for the identifica-
tion of natural or artificial internal marks {2) (3) (8), two solutions were 
tested. 
2 .1. Identification of the fuel element 
2.1.1. During the fabrication process, before rolling, some tungsten 
inclusions are printed in the upper part of the frame {item B, Fig. 2). 
The rolling causes these inclusions take random positions in the upper 
non-active part of the plate. 
The fabrication cycle of the plate remains unchanged. 
The. parameters giving a random and irreproduceable character to this 
type of marking are: 
a) inclusions with random shape, 
b) random position of the inclusion when pressed in the frame, 
c) random orientation and positioning due to rolling and also to the 
finishing of the plates {cutting of the ends). 
The tungsten inclusions have dimensions of about 1 mm length and 
0, 3 mm diameter. 
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2. I. 2. The identity is recorded by ultrasonic scanning of the upper edge 
of the plate {Fig. 3). 
A 
MTR 
PLATE 
Fig. 3 
This examination is made by the immersion technique. 
The identities are clear, and easy to record on separate plates. 
If one has to check the identity of the plates once they are in the fuel 
bundle, mechanical scanning is so complicated that another method has 
been chosen. { Cf. § 2. 2) 
2.1.3. This identification of MTR fuel plates, tested in the laboratory, 
has given very good results and it can remain a highly valuable control 
method for individual fuel plates. 
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2. 2. Identification of the fuel bundle using a seal 
2. 2. I. Principle 
The fissile materials flowing from the fabrication plant to the reprocess-
ing plant are contained in fuel elements. This containment can be 
considered at the level of the single plate as it is made for the identifica-
tion of the plates but also at the level of the assembly: the fuel bundle. 
In order to guarantee the integrity of the "confined" fissile materials, 
the container must be tamper-resistant and have a unique identity. 
Instead of using natural or artificial marks printed in the container 
(edge plates or fuel plates of the MTR element), marked seals are 
applied. 
2.?.2. Rivet seal 
Fig. 4 
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As shown on Figure 4, the seal is composed of a .disc (item 1, Fig. 4) 
in which the inclusions are inserted (Cf. § 3) foli'owing the same 
identification principle as that described for the identification of the 
plates. 
A cylindrical foot (item 2, Fig. 4) completes the seal and gives the 
rivet shape. 
While positioning the seal in a prepared seat in the fuel element, the 
foot is deformed and, being made of a special material ( Cf. § 3), 
cannot be taken off without being broken. Rewelding or gluing the foot 
is quite impossible, in view of both the small dimensions and the weak 
point (item 3, Fig. 4). A seal cannot be used twice (Cf. § 2.3). 
The place chosen for sealing is where the nozzle overlaps the edge 
plates. (Fig. 5) 
Fig. 5 
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When dismantling the MTR fuel element, one cannot avoid cutting the 
nozzle and destroying the edge plates; this is impossible without damag-
ing or removing the seal. 
This sealing principle offers the advantage of not modifying the characteris-
tics and the qualities of the containers and of the fuel plates. It eliminates 
the control of single plates and avoids any difficulties caused by the 
inclusions being placed rather close to the meat in the MTR plate. 
During separate visits made to France ( CERCA), Italy (SALUGGIA) , 
Belgium (MMN) and Germany (NU KEM), this solution was considered 
by the MTR fuel element manufacturers as a reliable one for the fuel. 
2.3. Identification of the seal (4) 
The principle remains the ultrasonic detection of inclusions, but instead 
of having a plate as in§ 2.1.1., we have a disc containing inclusions. 
Using industrial ultrasonic apparatus, the signals obtained by scanning 
the seals are very satisfactory. The general method used is based on 
reflection due to the great difference of acoustical impedance existing 
between the matrix and the inclusions. The transducers are standard 
commercial focused models, which are able to select accurately the 
zone to be explored. 
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The mechanical part of the installation serves to position the transducer 
with great reproducibility (5) and to make the seal: rotate regularly around 
its mechanical axis. (Fig. 6) 
]fig. 6 
The installation is calibrated either on an artificial standard defect or 
on an inclusion in the seal. 
The identity is obtained by all the echos coming back from the seal. 
Due to the small diameter of the seal, ultrasonic waves give more than 
one echo for one inclusion and the examination of a small part of the 
seal would be sufficient for identification purposes. (4) (5). 
The structure of the seal has a great influence on the identity. 
No structural changes occur during irradiation in the reactor because 
of the low running temperature. 
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The identity can be codified without losing its unique character: to each 
maximum amplitude response is assigned a confidence interval due to the 
imperfect reproducibility; knowing the maximum and minimum values of 
implitude response, the number of discrete values which one inclusion 
can give is calculated. To each of these values one character is assigned. 
The chosen characters (alphabet Q) and the number of detected inclusions 
(format I) define a codification language. 
This language contains L words: 
L = QI 
which correspond to L different possible identities. 
The registration of the electrical output signals is made in analog form 
(by pen or photographic recorder) (Fig. 7). The readouts obtained are 
easy to interpret and may be used integrally or partially as an identity 
card. These analog data can be coded in digital form for automatic 
storage and checking. 
Fig. 7 
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Fig. 8 illustrates the control chain showing different alternatives. By 
using the complete chain one can, at any time and without difficulty: 
-- bring the library up to date, 
- print the results, 
- have the general situation of the fissile materials under control. 
Moreover, with the data centrally stored in a computer, all other informa-
tion obtained by other control methods can be added in. 
A portable apparatus which is under development ( 6) will give the possibil-
ity of immediate verification on the spot. 
The whole experiment performed for the identification of MTR fuel 
elements described in this report deals only with identification by sealing: 
the seal impedes the dismantling of the bundles and gives the identity to 
the fuel. 
However, the possibility of identifying single plates should not be forgotten. 
2 .4. Different control schemes 
2 .4.1. Interest of the diverter 
The interest of a potential diverter for a given fuel element depends on (7): 
- the quality and the quantity of the strategic material contained in a fuel 
element, 
- the accessibility of the fuel element, 
- the ease of extraction of the strategic material from the fuel element 
(which generally requires appropriate chemical facilities). 
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Fig. 9 shows graphically for these parameters the interest of the diverter 
as a function of the position of the fuel in the cycle: 
As a result of this schematic analysis, it appears that a minimum of 4 
control points are necessary: 
I. Sealing of the fabrication plant after physical measurements, 
2. Control of the fuel before entering the reactor (new seal), 
3. Control of the irradiated fuel in the pool (new seal), 
4. Control at the reprocessing plant. 
The control point 3 (or 4) could be ignored due to the diminished interest 
after irradiation. 
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2 .4. 2. The seal permits the identity measurement to be done on the spot 
with portable instruments or at a central control point. It permits a 
centralization of controls, which increases the reliability of the system. 
The different sequences could then be as follows for the identification of 
seals as a function of their position in the fuel cycle: 
a) Complete control without portable apparatus {Fig. I 0) 
F St Re Rp 
r-1 
r-1 ro ro Q) Q) {ll 
{ll 
.µ 
{ll 't1 
r-1 s::: N 
..... 
0 
..... 
0 0 
r-1 ro r-1 
r-1 0 C) 0 ro 1-1 {ll 1-1 Q) .µ .µ 
{ll i:: ~ .:; 
0 Q) 0 .µ 
t) i:: t) {ll 
1-1 
..... 
..... 
Ge :___ Po. 
Legend: 
Fig. 10 
Rp = Reprocessing 
Ce Po. = Central Point 
F = Fabrication 
St = Storage 
Re= Reactor PA = Portable Apparatus 
CP= Cooling Pool 
Three seals are thus necessary. 
b) Simplified without portable apparatus {Fig. Ila and llb) 
F St Re C.P ;Rp 
r-1 
n:I r-1 r-1 Q) 0 ro {ll 1-1 C) 
.µ 
't1 i:: {ll N 0 't1 t) i:: .... 
0 0 
t) r-1 
Q) 0 
{ll 1-1 
i:: 
0 
Ce Po. 
Fig. Ila 
-I8-
F Re C:P R 
"' 
..... 
Q) 
"' (/) Q) sealing of transit container 
..... (/) 
"' 
-------'> Q) 'Cl 
fll N 
..... 
,-f i:: 0 
"' 
0 ..... Q) CJ 0 (/) Cl) Jot 
+,t tll 1= (I) 
Jot 0 
.... N CJ 
..... 
..... 
Ce Po 
Fig. llb 
c) complete control with portable apparatus (Fig. 12) 
F Re CP R 
1 2 3 
+-> 
+-> 
~I ..... 
(JI gl 
0 ~ ,-I ..... ..... ..... ~ ro 0 ~ (\j 0 ..... +-> Q) +-> i::1 
V +-> i:: I ro ..-i i:: I (I) ,-I (I) r-1 •M Q) ::l .... ::l '"I ~ ~,I (I) ~ '01 ..c: ~ ~I +-> .µ 
(I) 0 ml 'Cl ~ NI (") ~ ;;;, 
~ ~ r-41 N I 
.... 
4-4 I 
Ce Po. ___ j 
Fig. 12 
The central point of control identifies only new seals and keeps the initial 
records. No transportation of irradiated seals is necessary, no delay 
occurs in the verification of the identity. 
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d) Simplified scheme with portable apparatus. {Fig. I3a) 
The most logical scheme is: 
F St Re CP 
1 1 2 
2 
PA PA 
• r-1 
-1-' I ro o, r-1 I V t+-r ro 
~, C/l 0 8., V 
-1-' oo I C/l t+-r o, -I-' 
..-f s::: 0 &• C/l :i ..... ' 'U f.{ N -1-' CD I r-1 ...... m ,L,) 
::s s:::, ..... <D C/l 
f.{ ,-1 CD ,,.... 
C> 'U I 
J-4 NI Ce Po. ___ :.J 
Fig. 13a 
R p 
e) When two seals are put on the fuel element as was done for one element 
in HFR Petten (Cf. § 4.3.), the best scheme is: {Fig. 13b) 
F 
-I-' 
C/l 
f.{ 
...... 
........... _ ... 
St 
ro 
V 
C/l 
Re 
3 
Ce 
Fig. 13b 
Po. 
R p 
This optimum scheme does not require seals to be put on irradiated fuel 
elements under water. 
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Other simplified schemes are easy to imagine. 
The choice of the scheme to be adopted depends on the philosophy adopted 
by the Safeguard Authority and on the delays that this Authority can accept 
between two controls. 
3. FABRICATION OF THE SEAL 
3 .1. Materials used 
As was said in § 2. 2. 2., the rivet seal is composed of two parts: 
- one disc, bearing the identity, 
- one foot, blocking the seal at a critical point of the bundle. 
An example of the dimensions and tolerances is given on Fig. 14 
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Fig. 14 
These tolerances should avoid any gap or overlapping of the seal on the 
edge-plate. 
The length of the foot depends on the thickness of the nozzle wall at the 
fixation point of the seal. 
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The weak-point of the seal (0.25 mm thickness) in the foot makes only a 
small effort necessary for taking the disc off the fuel bundle in order to 
verify the identity. (Extraction force : 50 kg_:!: 20%). 
The chosen materfal is a SAP (Sintered Aluminium Powder (7)) 1 % to 
2% Al203 • The inclusions are of tungsten and have a grain size of about 
0, 3 mm diameter and 1 mm length. 
(Radiography of the seal on Fig. 15) 
Fig.-- 15 
This SAP material allows deformations for blocking the seal as a rivet 
but makes any recuperation impossible without breakage. Welding for 
re-use is difficult with this basic material and the identity of the disc 
would be changed even by small changes of the material structure due 
to temperature elevation. 
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3 .2. Fabrication of prototypes 
3.2.1. For prototypes, the SAP powder was put into the pressing matrix 
in two different steps: 
- first quantity : 1 /5 {volume) 
- some inclusions {5 to 7) (5) 
- second quantity : 4/5 {volume) 
in order to obtain blocks with inclusions at the right position. {Fig. 16) 
Fig. 16 
2 
3.2.2. After cold pressing at 50 kg/mm during 1 minute and then hot 
· o 2 pressing at 500 C for 1, 5 minutes at 100 kg/cm , the blocks are machined 
at the workshop. 
No price evaluation is possible for this type of laboratory work. 
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3 .3. Industrial fabrication of seals 
The NUKEM firm (Hanau, Germany) has taken a licence for our patents(!) 
and has made a preliminary evaluation for the industrial fabrication of 
seals. (Cfr. § 9.4.5~). 
4. PREPARATION OF THE FUEL ELEMENT AND SEALING 
4. 1 • Principle 
As said in § 2, concerning the fuel element itself, during its fabrication 
cycle a hole must be drilled right through to receive the foot of the rivet 
seal. This supplementary machining is made at the overlapping zone of 
the edge plate and the nozzle. (Fig. 17) 
Fig. 17 
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The edge plate will have a second hole centered_ on the first one in order 
to have the disc inside the plate. 
The tolerances are rather severe to avoid that the seal overlaps the edge 
plate; if hot, the seal might be damaged when the fuel element is put into 
its channel or storage box. The holes have to be made at the fabrication 
plant as one of the last steps of the fuel fabrication cycle. 
4. 2. Tests made at NUKEM 
Some seal seats were machinea at NUKEM on a dummy element maintain-
ing the normal fabrication operations, both in the workshop of the 
manufacturing plant and in the personnel in charge of the last steps of the 
fuel fabrication cycle. No difficulties occurred due to the imposed 
tolerances, and the quality of the fuel element remained unchanged. 
The time required for this modification was estimated to be 1 /2 hour. 
Two drilling cutters were used for this work and no special devices 
were prepared for the exact positioning of the fuel on the bench. Having 
the correct prepared double cutter for making the seat in one operation, 
and having a blocking device for rapid and precise positioning of the fuel 
element on the bench, no time would be lost either for the measurement 
or for the selection of the reference surfaces. 
The price of this operation, if it were a normal step in the fuel fabrica-
tion cycle, could then be much lower. 
Seals were put on and taken off at the workshop by the NUKEM people 
with tools prepared at Ispra. The seal was strongly fixed onto the fuel 
element and was easily taken off by breaking the foot due to the machined 
weak point and to the choice of the most suitable material. 
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The tool used is a grip with interchangeable fingers: for placing the,,seal, 
a sphere; for taking it off, a punch. (Fig. 18) 
Fig. 18 
Fig. 19 
Fig. 19 shows a new and a broken seal 
No alteration of the seat in the element was visible after putting and 
taking off ten seals. 
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Sealing of five fuel elements at HFR Petten 
For sealing, five fuel elements were prepared in the workshop of the 
HFR reactor. 
Sealing was made with the tool described in § 4. 2 and the five fuel elements 
entered the reactor on May 13, 197 2. 
One fuel elements received two seals. 
Table 1 gives the schedule of the sealed fuel elements in the HFR reactor. 
Two of them followed a fast cycle (N783 and N789) 
Element Period in reactor Burn-up (%) Seal Nbr. 
N783 14.5.72-14.6.72 17,7 
15.6.72-30.6.72 29,0 4 and 
31.7.72-15.8.72 35.9 12 
16.8.72- 1.9.72 
N789 14.5.72-28.5.72 14,6 
2.6.72-14.6.72 24,3 7 31.7.72-15.8.72 34. 9 
1.9. 72-14.9. 72 42,4 
N787 14.5. 72-28.5. 72 12,6 
2.6.72-14.6.72 20,2 
31.7.72-15.8.72 27,7 9 
1.9.72-14.9.72 35,7 
23.11.72-12.12.72 44,5 
N788 13,0 
22,7 
ibid 32,8 13 
39, 9 
45,4 
N790 14,5 
22,8 
29,5 5 
35,7 
45,5 
Table I 
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5. EXTRACTION OF SEALS UNDER WATER AFTER IRRADIATION 
5 .1. Tools for extraction 
In § 4.2., the extraction tool is described. This tool is used when a seal 
has to be removed in the fabrication plant, or at the dry storage of the 
reactor. 
For taking off the seal in the pool under 3 to 10 m of water, it was 
necessary to modify this tool (Fig. 20). 
These modifications are: 
- remote control of the extraction punch, 
- tube for guiding the extraction punch just in front of the seal, with a 
locking system, 
- disc recovery pocket which can be opened at distance. 
Fig. 20 
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Tests and simulatiens ef the teel were made at Ispra using the dummy 
element. (Fig. 21) 
Fig. 21 
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The different steps of the operation are shown on the Figures 22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 27. 
Fig. 22 
Fig. 23 
-30-
Pi~. 25 
-31-
Fig. 26 
Fig. 27 
Fig. 27 shows that the identified disc can be easily recovered. 
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The extraction was pe:rformed, for demonstration at 10 m distance and 
at 3 m distance, corresponding to the different extreme positions that 
the fuel element can adapt in the cooling pool. 
These operations were also made in the HFR cooling pool in November 
1972 for the seals 4, 12, and 7 and in February 73 for the seals 9, 13 
and 5 (see Table I). 
5.2. Control of the seal identity, after irradiation 
Figure 2 8a and 2 8b show the good reproduceability found for the identity 
0 
measurements of seal n 4. 
The first identity was taken in May Ith 1972. The second one in December 
1972, after irradiation. The schedule followed by the seal is the one 
given on Table I. 
Fig. 28a 
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Fig: 28b 
No alteration of the basic material is visible on the surface of the 
irradiated seal (Fig. 30). 
Fig. 29 
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~ .3. Isotopic analysis of the irradiated seal and contamination of the 
identification apparatus 
The analysis of seal n°4 was made by gamma spectrometry with a Ge(Li) 
detector and by examining the energy interval from 80 to 1 800 keV. 
The analysis made on 15. 3. 73 showed the presence of the following 
gamma emitter radio-isotopes. (Fig. 3 0) 
Fig. 30 
The contact radiation intensity was about 1 mR /h when the seal was taken 
out of the water; no superficial contamination was found and the seals did 
not contaminate the identification apparatus. However, a rough sealing 
is necessary before identification. 
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The rather low activity and the small danger of contaminatipn allow the 
use of a portable apparatus for identification of the seal in the reactor 
hall; the shielding is not complicated, the seal being identified under 
water in an identification device. 
5 .4. Cutting the nozzle before sending the fuel element to be reprocessed 
Before transportation to the reprocessing plant, the two nozzles of the 
fuel element are cut. The mrmal cutting line is very near the position 
foreseen for the seal. 
In such a case, the fuel would lose its identity if the seal were to be 
destroyed. 
It is however possible, for several MTR fuel element types, to cut about 
20 mm further towards the end of the box. 
The transportation containers can accommodate this small increase in 
box length (HFR Petten, Ispra 1). 
The cost of the reprocessing of the remaining material (corresponding to 
some mm length of the box) has to be added to the cost of the seal. 
Figure 31 shows the end-box of fuel bundle n°783 as it is normally cut. 
About 20 mm more will be sufficient for conserving the seal. 
The approximate supplementary cost for reprocessing the extra 50 g. 
left on the box is equal to 6 US 'If for each fuel bundle. 
This cost must be added to the cost of the seal. 
-36-
Fi;;. 31 . 
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6. RELIABILITY OF THE METHOD 
6.1. Tamper-resistance of the identity of the seal (5) 
6.1.1. As said in § 2, the identification chain is calibrated. 
The portable apparatus is automatically calibration to the greatest 
response encountered. 
Although this calibration allows one to speak of absolute values, the 
identity is considered to be a collection of relative values (Cf. § 2.3). 
The codification of the identity is made on the basis of thorough know-
ledge of the confidence intervals associated with the elementary informa-
tion of the identity. The confidence intervals were obtained by systematic 
identifications. 
Assuming that the mechanical and electronic parts of the chain, as well 
as the transducer used, will always remain near the tolerances given 
and accepted during the statistical tests, we can evaluate the number of 
inclusions needed to be sure of being able to: 
- identify uniquely the total amount of seals (K) 
- take the confidence intervals into account (H) 
(uncertainty on the elementary information) 
For example: when K = 104 (10.000 seals) with an uncertainty on a single 
response (H) equal to 5%, we need to identify 5 to 8 inclusions. 
6.I.2. No important alteration of the seal can be accepted. 
However, some superficial damage does not alter the identity (4). If a 
diverter tries to re-use a broken seal by gluing or welding the foot onto 
the disc, he will destroy the identity of the tamper will be easily detected 
when taking off the seal or by visual inspection. 
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6.2. Tamper-resistance of the identification of the fuel element 
As said in § 2.2.2., the extraction of single plates from the box is impos-
sible without machining (or destroying) the edge plates. 
Cutting the plate around the seal is difficult but possible, to replace the 
seal on a n~w box is impossible due to the lack of ductility of the seal 
material when plastically deformed. 
When an absolute tamper-resistance is required, all the plates of the 
assembly have to be identified (Cf. § 2.1). 
To clarify this idea, it can be stated that an optimal choice exists between 
the complications that can be introduced to protect the fuel element and 
the chance of failure during control. 
The probability (p
1 
.) of success in tampering with an element decreases 
with the increasing degree of complication of the application of th~ method 
(several seals + identification of the plates •• ); the probability (p2) of 
making an error in identification and thus the probability of having a high 
degree of uncertainties, while verification increases with the complication 
of the system: Fig. 32 
p
1 
of success in tampering 
complication degree 
Fig. 32 
2 of making an 
erroneous chec 
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7. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THE RIVET SEAL 
7. I. Identification of other types of MTR fuel elements 
7. I. I. Fuel elements such as the bundle of the Geesthacht ,reactor can 
be identified in the same way. 
These fuel bundles do not have the nozzle welded to the edge plate of the 
box, but it is mounted by screwing. 
If the box has two screws on each end of the plates, the seal must be 
located between the screws. (Fig. 33) 
Fig. 33 
If three screws exist, the central one can be replaced by a rivet seal. 
(Fig. 33) 
-4 0-
7.1.2. For cylindrical fuel elements (Br2 , Essor, Dido), one or more 
of the combs blocking the curved or cylindrical plates can be sealed 
using a rivet seal. (Fig. 34) 
Fig. 34 
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7. 2. General use seal with wire 
On the same principle, a rivet seal can be used for blocking the 
extremities of a tamper-resistant wire. (Fig. 35) 
, Fig. 35 
T~is new type of general use seal has the same degree of tamper-resistance 
as the one designed for the MTR bundle. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. The ultrasonic method for the identification of MTR plates and of 
rivet seals was extensively studied in our laboratories and the 
confidence limits were found statistically. 
8. 2. The modifications necessary to the fuel element box for applying 
the seal are simple and do not damage the fuel element. 
8.3. Positioning and removing the seal are easy. Seals were extracted 
in the HFR reactor cooling pool even under 10 m of water. 
8. 4. The seal is not damaged by irradiation in the reactor. 
Its re identification is easy, no contamination danger exists and the 
identity is reproduceable. 
8.5. From our cost evaluations it appears that ( § 9.4.5) the total cost 
of the seal is rather high but the system offers the possibility of 
diminishing the inspection effort and thus the price of Safeguards. 
The identification apparatus used is the same for all types of seals. 
The fabrication cost of the seal cannot be reduced, due to the preci-
sion required in order to avoid any damage to the seal or to the fuel 
box. 
8 •. 6. Fuel element manufacturers (NUKEM, MMN, CERCA), reactor 
operators (F..FR Petten, Ispra-1, Bh2 Mol), reproces sers (Salluggia) 
and research or fissile material management people (GfK, RCN, GEN, 
CNEN, HAR WELL) agree in principle with the technical feasibility 
of sealing the MTR fuel elements ( § 9.5). 
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9. MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
11 SEALING AND IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES 11 
Held at Ispra on November 7, 1973. 
9 .1. Scope of this Meeting 
This Meeting was the third of the Working Group on Identification and 
Sealing Techniques, which represents part of the European Community 
Safeguards Research and. Development Association (ESARDA). 
It permitted representatives of certain MTR reactors, and of fuel element 
manufacturing and reprocessing plants to express their opinions on the 
proposed method of safeguarding the MTR fuel elements by tamperproof, 
seals which has been developed by the J .. R. C. (Joint Research Centre) 
at ISPRA, as part of its Safeguards programme. 
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9. 2. Participants 
The list of participants is given below: 
Belgium 
MM. Bobin K. J. EURA TOM BR MOL 
Van Maele L. MMN DESSEL 
France 
MM. Dewez P. 
Marguin J.C. 
Germany 
CERCA 
CERCA 
ROMANS 
PARIS 
Reactor plant 
Fabrication plant 
Fabrication plant 
Fabrication plant 
MM. Brueckner C. GFK KARLSRUHE Safeguards project 
Italy 
Heger H. 
Kuehn H. 
Vietzke H. 
MM. Di Palo L. 
Hall A. 
Liscia A. 
Nederland 
MM. Harry R.J.S. 
Schinkel J. 
Jehenson C. 
United Kingdom 
Mr. Adamson A. 
KRB(VDEW) GUNDREMMINGEN Reactor plant 
NUKEM HANAU Fabrication plant 
NUKEM HANAU Fabrication plant 
CNEN 
CNEN 
CNEN 
ROMA 
SALUGGIA 
SALUGGIA 
RCN PETTEN 
RCN PETTEN 
EURATOM PETTEN 
AERE HARWELL 
Safeguards project 
Reprocessing plant 
Fabrication plant 
Safeguards project 
Reactor plant, HFR 
Reactor plant, HFR 
Safeguards project 
Safeguards Directorate Luxemburg 
MM. Miranda U. EURA TOM 
Schleicher H. W. 11 
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Joint Research Centre ISPRA 
MM. Prins A. EURA TOM ESSOR Reactor 
Wiederstein P.' " ESSOR Reactor 
Bresesti M. " Safeguards Project 
Foggi C.' " Safeguards Project 
Borloo E. " Non Destructive Section 
II 
Buergers W. " Materials Division 
Crutzen S. ~ " " 
II 
Dal Gero J. ~ " " " 
Jehenson P. " " 
II 
Marchal F. " " " 
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9. 3. Agenda of this working group 
9.3 .1. Draft Document 
" A rivet seal for safeguarding the MTR fuel elements" 
S. Crutzen, P. Jehenson, E. Borloo, W. Buergers - JRC Ispra 1973 
constituted the basis of the technical discussions of the Working Group. 
The main items of this paper were also the items on the agenda of the 
meeting; this paper was distributed two weeks before the meeting. 
9. 3 • 2 • Agenda 
9.30 
9.40 
9.50 
------
Presentation of the participants and of the agenda (S. Crutzen) 
Introduction ( P. Jehenson) 
Identification method of the MTR fuel elements (S. Crutzen) 
Criteria and difficulties 
Mar king of the plates 
Sealing of the container (box) 
10. 25 Ultrasonic identity measurement (E. Borloo) 
10 .45 Fabrication of seals and preparation of seats in the edge plate 
of the box (S. Crutzen) 
11.45 Experiments performed in HFR PETTEN (S. Crutzen) 
Irradiation of seals 
Extraction tool 
Reidentification of irradiated seals 
Contamination 
Cutting of the nozzles 
11. 45 Reliability of the method (S. Crutzen) 
14.30 Discussions and other proposed items 
15.45 Conclusions (P. Jehenson) 
16.30 Demonstration of the apparatus (W. Buergers, J.Dal Cera, F. Marcha 
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9.4. Main points discussed during the meeting 
After the several presentations listed in the agenda, which were made 
principally by Mr. Crutzen, some points were commented on and discussed. 
9.4.1. Marking of the fuel plates 
The marking of the fuel plates was abandoned in 1971 by the JR C, Ispra, 
due to several reasons which were confirmed during the meeting. 
a) From a fabrication viewpoint it is not interesting to put inclusions in 
the fuel plate {M. Dewez). 
b) It cannot be acceptable from a reprocessing viewpoint. 
Only those inclusions soluble in boiling HN0 3 could be accepted 
{M. Hall). 
c) From a Safeguards viewpoint it is complicated to control i,n certain 
special cases, when loose plates are in circulation, marking of the 
plates might be accepted {M. Schleicher). 
The use of a seal gives a positive answer to these problems. 
9 .4. 2. Location of the seal 
------------------
The chosen place for HFR elements was at the overl'apping point of the 
edge plate and the nozzle, due to the fact that it is impossible to pull out 
the plates without destroying the edge plate and thus the seal: MM. Dewez, 
Van Maele and Vietzke confirmed this practical impossibility. 
M. Schinkel insisted on the seal being placed at the lower part of the fuel; 
due to the direction of the cooling system. M. Crutzen added that this 
position should also be discussed as a function of the position of the bundle 
when in storage : the extraction of seals should be done without handling 
the fuel elements. 
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9.4.3. Properties of the seal 
--------------------
9.4.3.l. Nuclear Purity 
M. Dewez asked if the nuclear regulations are re,spected concerning the 
material used. M. P. Jehenson answered that the materials used for the 
fabrication of the seals are the ones used for cladding rra terials in the 
OR GEL project (SAP powders with nuclear Aluminium). 
9.4.3.2. Corrosion 
In reply to a question from M. Di Palo, M. P. Jehenson (Ispra) answered 
that the choice of SAP for the fabrication of the seal and the position of 
the seal on the edge plate (Al alloy), the low temperature at this point of 
. the fuel element avoid any corrosion problems. The good practical 
results obtained with seals on MTR fuel elements submitted to a normal 
irradiation cycle in the HFR reactor at Petten have confirmed that no 
corrosion problem arose. M. P Jehenson also pointed out that the condi-
tions leading to corrosion or some detorioration of the seal, would have 
corroded and destroyed the plates already long before. This seal is 
prepared by sintering of SAP powders at 600°C. M. Schleicher confirmed 
that a great deal of work was done by him on that point at Ispra, for the 
ORGEL project. 
MM. C. Jehenson and Schinkel also confirm that during the experiments 
at HFR Petten no corrosion appeared on the seals and that it seems 
impossible for it to occur, even if numerous scrams (question of M. Di Palo) 
occurred during the irradiation of these seals. 
M. Bc,bin also confirmed this opinion. 
9.4.3 .3. Vibrations 
In reply to a question from M. Babin, M. Crutzen stated that, for the MTR 
fuel element seals, it is very difficult to have vibrations if the seal is well 
riveted (correct choice of the material). 
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9. 4. 3. 4. Tamper-resistance of the seal 
To the question of M. Brueckner concerning the possible reuse of a seal 
by rewelding or gluing the foot to the identified disk, MM. Crutzen and 
P. Jehenson answered that it seems to be impossible 
a) to reweld without creating small changes in the identity, recorded by 
ultrasonics, due to the position and the dimensions of the weak zone 
(see Fig. 14), 
b) to glue without visual detection, due to the same reasons as in a). 
c) the tamper-resistance of the container has to be examined for each 
cases of application and its integrity has to be verified when the seals 
are checked (M. Harry). 
9.4.3.5. Irradiation results 
The experience gained on 6 seals placed on MTR fuel elements irradiated 
in the HFR Petten indicated 
- no reactor problems 
- no special problem for the extraction of tre irradiated seals. If this 
method of identification is applied for the part of the cycle passing 
through the reactor, it will be necessary to use in the cooling pond an 
extraction tool better designed than the prototype used at Petten, in 
order to avoid any need to manipulate the irradiated fuel elements 
(M. Schinkel). The design of this extraction tool has already been modified. 
- no special contamination on the seals. The seals have only to be cleaned 
with water before going to the identity measurement apparatus. 
- that the identity is well conserved after irradiation. 
9.4.4. Applications of seals on other MTR fuel elements 
M. Dewez asked if the experiences gained at Petten are extrapolatable 
to other MTR fuel elements. 
MM. Crutzen and P. Jehenson answered that this method of sealing by 
an identified rivet can be applied to all other types of MTR fuel elements. 
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Some small amount of design will have to be carried out in order to take 
into account the particular design criteria of each fuel type (see § 7. I.). 
The experience gained at Petten is very representative for MTR type 
fuel elements, since the HFR _Petten reactor is a high flux material 
testing reactor. 
9.4.5. Costs 
In reply to a question from M. Van Maele about the price of the seal and 
who has to pay, M. Crutzen gave the following rough evaluation making 
some hypothesis: 
9.4.5.1. Hypotheses 
a. There are 1000 fuel elements to be safeguarded per year 
b. 3 seals are necessary for each fuel element(§ 2.4.) 
c. l static and 1 portable apparatus are used 
d. The same identification apparatus is also used, for cap seals (LWR 
fuel elements) and for general use seals 
e. All apparatus and tools are written off in 10 years 
f. The checking is done in Europe (low travel costs for inspectors). 
9.4.5.2. Cost of the seal U.C. 
(l UC = 50 FB) 
a. fabrication 6. 00 
b. 2 identification apparatus: 2 x l O. OOO to 15. OOO UC· 
thus, following hypotheses a, b, d, e, for each seal O .30 
c. grip and extraction tools: about l OOO UC for each 
reactor! thus, due to hypotheses a, e 0.40 
d. preparation of the seat of the seal ( § 4.1) 
5 UC for one fuel element thus due to hypothesis b 1. 70 
e. supplementary reprocessing cost ( § 5. 4) 
6 UC thus due to hypothesis b 2.00 
f. Total cost, including seal and technical devices 10 .40 UC. 
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9.4.5.3. Inspection cost 
From personal contacts with USAEC people, it appears that a minimum 
inspection cost reported on one seal (IAEA seal) (inspectors, travels, 
computer time) would be about 10 UC ::.~:;; 
9.4.5.4. Total cost 
The total cost of the one seal is thus about 20 UC. 
Due to hypotheses a and b, safeguarding the MTR fuel elements during the 
considered part of the fuel cycle considered-will cost a minimum of 
60.000 UC a year. 
9. 4. 5 • 5 • Who will pay ? 
To this question, M. Schleicher answered that up to now, since no official 
dec_isions have been taken the application of such a technique has to be 
financially supported by the Safeguards Directorate of the European 
Community. 
9. 4. 6. Licencing the application of this patented identification and sealing 
-----------------------------------------------------------
method 
To the question of M. Dewez concerning the licence bought by NUKEM, 
M. Crutzen answered that this involved the two Euratom patents as well 
as all the know-how concerning the application of the method. MM. Kuehn 
and P. Jehenson pointed out that the licences given by the European Community 
are not exclusive • 
...... ,. 
From discussions on 30.11. 73 at Brookhaven Lab, with M. C. Sastre 
this cost appears to be about 20 UC for the Euratom seal whe~ controls 
have to be done in the reactor hall). 
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9.4. 7. Problem of warranties concerning fuel elements and reactors 
-------------------------------------------------------
In reply to a question from M. Marguin, M. Schi'eicher answered that the 
responsability of using this method, if it is applied, will be taken by the 
European Commission according to the opinion of the Commission jurists. 
9. 4. 8. Control philosophy 
Several points were discussed, principally by M. Brueckner M. Schleicher 
and M. Miranda. 
It is not intended to summarise this discussion here, because this point 
is not directly connected with the scope of this particular technical 
meeting. 
Practically, as confirmed by the discussions, the proposed sealing technique 
seems a good tamper indicating technique to be used for insuring that fissile 
material inside the sealed container is not diverted during that part of the 
cycke between the fabrication plant and the reprocessing plant. 
This method simplifies the checking procedures of the Safeguards Division 
and, in some cases, permits a control of non diversion where other methods 
may not be applicable. 
This conclusion is also valid for other seals studied at Ispra for other 
types of fuel elements; for instance, cap seals for LWR fuel elements 
for which irradiation experiments have been made since mid-72 in the 
Lingen and Gundremmingen reactors. 
9. 5. Conclusions 
The main conclusions, given by P. Jehenson, are: 
9.5.1. The MTR fuel element: 
The method of putting the rivet seals on the edge plates gives no complica-
tion to the fabrication palnt, the reactor plant or the reprocessing plant. 
The severe criteria imposed by these plants are all respected. 
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9.5.2. The seals: 
They can be used on the type of MTR fuel element tested without any 
serious difficulties. They are manufactured from Nuclear Quality 
Materials, provide no difficulties in fabrication, and should withstand 
the vibration found in most reactors. The investigators are confident 
that there will be no problems from activity or contamination. The 
seals have been success fully tested in Ispra-1 reactor and in theligh 
flux reactor at Petten. It is realised that conditions such as vibration 
and coolant characteristics vary. 
9.5.3. The identity 
----------
After irradiation, the identities taken initially by ultrasonics are well 
preserved. 
9.5.4. Interest of this identification technique 
-----------------------------------
From a Safeguards viewpoint, the interest of sealing MTR fuel elements 
is the easy check on the circulation of fissile material from the fabrica-
tion plant to the reprocessing plant and while passing through the reactor. 
In this important part of the cycle, fresh MTR fuel elements are obvious-
ly more interesting than irradiated ones from a diverter's viewpoint. 
The rivet seal gives a unique tamperproof identity to these MTR fuel 
elements, from fabrication to destruction at the reprocessing plant. 
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9.5.5. Conclusion 
We consider that we have finished our experimental work on the sealing 
of the MTR fuel elements, and we pass it on the Safeguards Directorate, 
in the hope that it will be applied as soon as possible. 
We shall naturally give all help needed for these applications and we hope 
that the reactor and plant operators will collaborate. 
These conclusions received the agreement of all those present and 
M. Schleicher expressed his wish that we shall arrive 'at a situation in 
which all MTR elements are sealed". 
S. CRUTZEN 
Secretary of the Working Group on 
Identification and sealing techniques 
of ES.ARDA. 
Ispra, November 12, 1973. 
P. JEHENSON 
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